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Abstract
Under a question whether corruption acts as grease or sand for development, this
paper estimates the effect of special allocation fund (SAF) or DAK in road sector to
infrastructure provision (road) at the district level in Indonesia. The political frag-
mentation and its political earmarking, defined as the effective number of central
parliamentary members from a district are used as an instrumental variable (IV)
for the amount of SAF in each district combined with a difference-in-difference
measure for the rural road. Such empirical strategy is adopted to tackle three
endogeneity problems: selection bias, measurement error and reverse causality be-
tween SAF allocation and rural road. First I find that the influence of political
earmark is statistically significant than the formula-based approach. Second, under
the influence of political earmarking, the IV result shows that the SAF allocation
does not affect a rural-road provision in Indonesia in the early implementation of
fiscal decentralisation. It seems that allocation based on the block grant or general
allocation fund is having more clear effect in the presence of earmarking of special
allocation fund. This also indicates the way of pork-barreling politics acts as the
’sand’ of SAF allocation in road sector, especially in a year before general election
in Indonesia.
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1 Introduction
An important debate in economic development that still gives a strong research moti-
vation is whether corruptions greases or sands the wheels of economic growth (Campos
et al., 2010). Indonesia, one of developing nation which experienced a big bang approach
to reform the economy and escape from heavy corruption to a more transparent and
efficient economy is an interesting case study in the area. Specifically, after the departure
of Soeharto in 1998, the system has been replaced by a more fragmented system that
leads to the circumstance that Indonesian corruption has become more unpredictable
(Resosudarmo and Kuncoro, 2006). This paper aims to fill in the gap by focusing on the
soft corruption case.
Those in favour of the sands hypothesis had tried to explain what works and what
does not to fight explicit or hard corruption using micro experiment approach at Indone-
sian context. These studies include Olken (2006, 2007, 2010) and Alatas et al. (2013,
2012). Alatas et al. (2013, 2012) provide evidence whether elite capture exists on the
allocation of household targeted government programs in Indonesia. They did not find
elite capture in the allocation of the program and favour of community targeting. Olken
(2006) used data from a large transfer program in Indonesia to investigate the extent of
corruption. He found that corruption is substantial; the central estimate is that at least
18% of the subsidised rice in the Indonesian program he studied went missing. Having
two competing of traditional top-down monitoring and community participation inter-
ventions, Olken (2007) found that the former had a larger average impact than the latter
using experimental data of road construction cost in Indonesia. Lastly, Olken (2010) finds
the superiority of direct participation in the representative-based meeting in determining
development project.
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On the other hand, there has been a limited study that focused on soft corruption such
as the misuse of public fund for private benefit but is considered legal in the system. The
most recent study in road infrastructure provision in Indonesia Kuncoro et al. (2013). The
authors focus on the varieties of governance of public goods (road) delivery in Indonesia
in the period of before and after the decentralisation and focus on the downstream side
of the project implementation. We acknowledge it as explicit corruption.
In 2001, Indonesian government formally reformed the institutional arrangement of
central-local relationship. It was a big-bang reform of intergovernmental level relationship
accompanied by a major reform of fiscal relationship between central and local. Since
then, the fiscal relationship had been strongly decentralised especially regarding revenue.
An emerging issue within such new arrangement is pork-barrel programs, an advocated
and self-interest biased resource allocation because of constituencies advocating policy
(Veiga and Veiga, 2013).
One of the fiscal instrument introduced was special allocation fund (SAF) as an ear-
marked type of fiscal transfer to ensure the catch-up progress of some sectors in some
specific regions. The use of earmarking fund is arguably the best instrument as it guaran-
tees the fund meet the priority agenda of development whenever the earmarking criteria
and process is objective and transparent. Indeed, the SAF in Indonesia was designed as
formula based fiscal transfer to become an efficient intergovernmental transfer instrument.
However, there has been a period of lack of readiness in the implementation that put
the system at risk of pork-barreling politics. That was in 2003 at the time when the
formula based implementation did not take place yet. Furthermore, the year was a year
before the general election. A time for a high probability for an incumbent parliamentary
member to practice utilisation of government funds for projects designed to please voters
or legislators and win votes, in which we refer to as pork-barreling politics or political
earmarking.
This paper aims to investigate the impact of introducing specific fund transfer to the
economic development in Indonesia under the hypothesis that the allocation is affected by
political earmarking. We focus on the variation of districts level in SAF allocation in road
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Figure 1: Political Fragmentation and Rural Road
SAF in Road Sector Rural Road Availability
Political Fragmentation
sector and the public good provision (road) to estimate the causal impact of introducing
the SAF on rural accessibility. The first objective is to answer a question whether there
was a soft corruption in the form of political earmarking in the allocation of special
allocation fund in the road sector in Indonesia in 2003. The subsequent important task
is to answer whether the impact of the allocation to rural road availability is significant
in rural area1.
2 Conceptual Framework
The system of intergovernmental transfer in Indonesia represents one of the most complex
systems ever implemented by any government in the world. The system is primarily
focused on a gap filling approach to provincial-local finance in an objective manner to
ensure revenue adequacy and local autonomy but without accountability to residents for
service delivery performance (Shah et al., 2012). The complexity of the system is also
reflected in the SAF allocation. The SAF is a fund that transferred from central to local
government for public good provisions that are considered become a national priority
from national level perspective. The allocation is made using a set of objective criteria
and formula based approach to ensure that the region who receive the fund is the region
with a sector that is prioritised. The decentralisation law for implementing the transfer
was enacted in 2000, yet the formula had been ready only in 2003. Therefore, up to 2003,
the allocation of SAF is discretion based and strongly opened possibility for local entities
to practice what so called pork-barrel politics.
1Although the SAF was not designed for the rural road. Indeed the majority of the project has been
conducted in rural area (Bappenas, 2011)
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The SAF allocation system uses a formula that has three level criteria (namely general,
specific and technical criteria) which involve several line ministries in determining the
operational variables. The complexity results in a lack of transparency wherein the line
ministry monopolised the indicator used. Furthermore, it opens the opportunity for
political intervention.
Based on the evaluation during the period 2003 2010 the essence of specific is drowned
out by more sightings of the essence of ’equalisation’ fiscal capacity both horizontally and
vertically which are more functions of the block grant (DAU) and Revenue Sharing Trans-
fer (DBH) (Wibowo et al., 2011). This finding suggests a strong hypothetical assumption
of the presence of political earmarking as wondered by the majority of stakeholders (Bap-
penas, 2011). Also, other literature also put doubt that the allocation is solely based on
a formula, and pointed out a practice of political earmark in the SAF allocation.
This study introduces the influence of political earmark or known as pork barreling
politics that is the utilisation of government funds for projects designed to please voters
or legislators and win votes (Caulier, 2010). Since the year of 2003 is the first time of SAF
implementation as well as the year of political campaign before 2004 general election in
Indonesia, the year gives a good combination to study the influence of political earmarking
as a soft-corruption in public service delivery, especially in the road sector.
The conceptual framework is summarised in Figure 1. Political fragmentation, defined
as the effective number of parliamentary member for each district hypothetically deter-
mines the allocation of SAF in the road sector in addition to the partial formula-based
allocation. The MPs are incentivized to use SAF allocation in road as pork-barreling
for two reasons: (i) road is the most tangible public infrastructure and popular tools
during the political campaign period and; (ii) in 2003 the Ministry of Finance had not
implemented a full formula-based approach due to lack of readiness of the line ministries
to provide basic data2.
Figure 2 indicates a region with less fractionalized central parliament member tends
2This proposition is implied in Bappenas (2011) and Wibowo et al. (2011). I performed an online
interview with one of a senior officer in the Directorate of Fiscal Transfer to confirm this proposition,
and there is no refute on the issue raised.
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Figure 2: Correlation between Fractionalization and SAF Allocation
to receive more allocation of SAF in the road sector. The formal test for this correlation
is later shown by the first-stage estimate of the allocation function, and it is statistically
significant after controlling district characteristics and criteria used to allocate the fund.
3 Data
Three datasets are used in this paper: parliamentary member (MP) by the district from
General Elections Commission (KPU), district budget SIKD (Information System for
Sub-National Budget) from Ministry of Finance, Village Census (PODES) conducted by
the Indonesian central statistical agency (BPS) and Statistic Indonesia.
The central parliamentary (DPR) membership used in this study is the result of 1999
general election in Indonesia. Notably, it was the first democratic election in the country
after 1998 reformasi. There were 465 central parliamentary members who were elected
and represented 321 districts. This study only accounts for 461 out of the 465 since four
elected members from Timor Leste (at the time was Timor Timur) were no longer active
since August 1999 as a result of Timor Timur independence from Indonesia. Among the
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districts, the average membership was 2, and DKI Jakarta had the largest member of
18. At the election, there had been 22 parties involved and participated in the election.
Among them, the five largest membership were PDI Perjuangan, Golkar, PPP, PKB and
PAN. We use these parties composition to measure political fragmentation (PF).
SIKD compiles yearly the sub-national budgets in which the intergovernmental trans-
fers were recorded. Using the information in the system, we extract three important
determinants of local government ability to provide public good spending: SAF, General
Purpose Transfer (DAU) and own source revenue (PAD). The third source of data used
is the Village Census that capture road length and the quality of road infrastructure at
Village Level. The percentage of the village with asphalt road is used as the indicator
of road sector outcome as it becomes downstream of sub-national road infrastructure
spending. Table 1 summarises the covariates and the dependent variable of the model in
2003. The last data set is Statistic Indonesia to extract the population number and area
for each district.
The third source of data used is the Village Census that capture road length and
the quality of road infrastructure at Village Level. The percentage of the village with
asphalt road is used as the indicator of road sector outcome as it becomes downstream
of sub-national road infrastructure spending. Table 1 summarises the covariates and the
dependent variable of the model in 2003. The last data set is Statistic Indonesia to
extract the population number and area for each district. Due to missing data for certain
variables, I can extract only 228 observations when I deal with technical data for SAF of
road sector criteria.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Change in outcome (% Village with asphalt road) 3.597 9.040 -29.21 36.46 317
special allocation fund in road sector (billion Rp) 1.77 1.535 0 7.5 317
DPR-party fractionalization index in 1999 0.255 0.365 0 1 317
outcome from previous PODES 61.919 25.601 4.69 100 317
technical criteria at base 318.904 599.791 2 4465 228
total GDP in billion 10.278 33.202 0.177 334.331 317
Total Population (in number of people) 1.24 3.577 0.042 38.206 317
Total Area (in Km) 0.009 0.026 0 0.317 317
general allocation fund (billion Rp) 225.773 108.271 52.14 957.616 317
own revenue (billion Rp) 80.188 358.847 1.975 5261.85 317
Infrastructure function expenditure (in IDR) 62.095 132.432 0.391 2073.6 317
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4 Estimation Strategy
To establish the causal impact of the new intergovernmental institutional arrangement
on economic development, this paper uses instrumental variable set up combined with
difference-in-difference approach for the dependent variable executed with 2 stage least
square (2SLS) technique. For special fund allocated (SAF) in road sector of region i, it
will affect the outcomes (y) as stated in the equation:
yi = α + β1SAFroad,i +Xiγ + εi (1)
Xi is set of control variables that cover sub-national economic structures (GDP),
spending behaviour (infrastructure spending), capacity (sources of revenues: general al-
location fund and own source revenue), and the element of SAF criteria (area, population
and length of road) that theoretically affect rural-road. The choice of these covariates
follows Kuncoro et al. (2013). The first potential upward bias of β1 is the selection bias.
Regions with poor road infrastructure are being targeted and prioritised to receive the
fund under the intergovernmental system. We do not acknowledge this as the reverse
causality problem because the outcome used to determine the allocation is two years
lag of the current financial year. Secondly, another threat to unbiased estimates will be
omitted variable bias. In the early decentralisation time, Indonesia still maintains some
of the line ministries programs that go directly to the region and influences road outcome
and theses allocations are not captured at the sub-national budget. Such data is not
unobservable, yet it hard to find as a result of spotty records in line ministries. Lastly,
IV also allows us to relax the assumption of the unobserved heterogeneity for each dis-
trict ability to perform road construction such as geographical variation and quality of
government.
For these reasons, we propose two strategies: (i) using difference-in-difference measure
for yi to overcome selection bias; and (ii) we instrument SAF allocation with political
fragmentation (PF) measure in each district. This lead to the following specification of
the first stage estimate:
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SAFi = α0 + β0PFi +Xiδ + µi (2)
PFi is the measure of central parliament fragmentation at the district level. It captures
how easy each member originated from a district to perform a pork barreling. The use
of PF will meet the exclusion restrictions for two arguments. First, PF was determined
in 1999, a time at the time of observation in this paper. Second, the only way PF effect
road outcome at the district level is through the SAF fund itself. Under Law No. 29 the
year 1999, the central parliamentary member does not have the legal influence to local
budget except for intergovernmental transfer including SAF.
Political fragmentation is defined as the effective number of political parties of each
district at the central parliamentary (DPR). Adopting the formula to measure fragmen-
tation in Caulier (2010), the index that reflects this measure is calculated as follows:
PFi = 1 −
∑
p
s2p (3)
The subscripts p refers to individual political parties, and s is a political partys share of
its total votes among members in the same district. PF equals 0 means no fragmentation
as a party takes all vote share and higher PF means higher political fragmentation. With
this construction, this paper assumes that as the effective number of political parties in
DPR for a district increases, political fragmentation increases and the ability of members
to perform political earmarking becomes weaker. Technically, to be a valid instrument,
we expect a negative correlation between SAF on road sector and PF.
This paper picks up the year 2003 as the time frame for the sample because that
particular year is the campaign year for the upcoming general election in 2004. It is
likely that the incumbents would use their influence to practice political earmarking or
pork barreling politics in that year and road is the most common club goods to exploit
in Indonesia.
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5 Result
5.1 Political Earmarking and SAF in Road Sector
The first-stage estimate in Table 2 suggests a strong indication of political earmarking
rather than the formula in determining the allocation of SAF on road sector in 2003. The
coefficient on PF is negative and statistically significant. The sign is also confirming the
instrument validity; the more fragmented political vote is, the less likely of the political
earmarking success thus, the less amount of SAF allocation will be. The excluded F-test
and Stock-Yogo statistic also support for the non-weak instrument.
The statistically insignificant coefficient of the formula confirms that during the early
time of implementing SAF, the Indonesian government had not ready yet to implement
the formula based. The concern over this readiness was raised in Wibowo et al. (2011) and
Bappenas (2011). The further interpretation that the allocation of SAF in road sector was
used as the campaign instrument to gain popularity among district of origin constituents
needs to be checked using primary data. This study put this as an opportunity for further
research.
Another important finding from the estimate is that when we observe the sign of each
indicator used in SAF on road sector formula in column (2), they capture the granted
region counter intuitively. For example, population and area are negatively correlated
with SAF allocation on road sector. This confirms the claim made by Shah et al. (2012)
that the intergovernmental system is the most complex one that results in unclear priority
of the fund.
5.2 The Impact of SAF in Road Sector to Rural Accessibility
Controlling for a set of the eligibility criteria, region size and political fragmentation as
the instrument for SAF allocation, the estimates of equation (2) as presented in Table
3 and it shows no impact of SAF allocation in road sector to rural road improvement.
Among the covariates, own source revenue (PAD) and general allocation fund (DAU)that
are associated with the improvement of rural accessibility and statistically significant. We
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Table 2: Determinants of SAF Allocation in Road Sector
Dependent: SAF in road sector (billion Rp) (1) (2)
DPR-party fractionalization index in 1999 -0.82∗ -1.36∗∗
(0.37) (0.36)
Outcome from previous PODES -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
Total GDP in billion -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Total Population (in million number of people) -0.05 -0.00
(0.06) (0.14)
Total Area (in Km2) -3.50 -2.76
(4.92) (6.71)
General allocation fund (billion Rp) -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Own revenue (billion Rp) 0.00∗∗ -0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Infrastructure function expenditure (in IDR) -0.00∗∗ -0.00∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
island=2 -0.34∗∗ -0.45∗∗
(0.07) (0.16)
island=3 0.62∗∗ 0.81∗∗
(0.11) (0.12)
island=4 0.20∗∗ 0.08
(0.04) (0.07)
island=5 0.63∗∗ 0.49∗∗
(0.07) (0.05)
island=6 -0.85∗ -0.93
(0.36) (0.54)
Technical criteria at base 0.00
(0.00)
Constant 2.85∗∗ 2.86∗∗
(0.30) (0.35)
Observations 319 229
Excluded F 5.02 17.59
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3: IV and OLS Estimates of Impact of SAF on Rural Accessibility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Special allocation fund in road sector (billion Rp) 0.17 0.58 -1.05 -0.32
(0.45) (0.55) (1.58) (1.19)
Outcome from previous PODES -0.08∗ -0.06 -0.08∗∗ -0.07
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Total GDP in billion -0.07∗ -0.18∗∗ -0.08∗ -0.18∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Total Population (in million number of people) 0.61∗ -0.40 0.52 -0.42
(0.25) (0.36) (0.35) (0.36)
Total Area (in Km2) -21.69 -52.29 -31.66∗∗ -58.38∗
(19.80) (38.92) (13.04) (33.75)
General allocation fund (billion Rp) 0.00 0.01∗ 0.00 0.01∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Own revenue (billion Rp) -0.01∗ 0.02∗∗ -0.00 0.02∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Infrastructure function expenditure (in IDR) 0.02∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.02 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
island=2 5.95∗∗ 6.41∗∗ 5.54∗∗ 5.98∗∗
(0.28) (0.60) (0.77) (1.08)
island=3 -2.82∗∗ -2.39∗∗ -1.85 -1.43
(0.61) (0.36) (1.81) (1.70)
island=4 -0.02 -0.41 0.34 -0.15
(0.26) (0.44) (0.43) (0.33)
island=5 3.89∗∗ 5.09∗∗ 4.85∗∗ 5.77∗∗
(0.44) (0.50) (1.35) (0.93)
island=6 3.81∗∗ 3.80∗ 3.37∗∗ 3.63∗∗
(1.12) (1.52) (0.74) (1.39)
technical criteria at base 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Constant 3.75 -0.39 7.09∗∗ 2.11
(2.97) (4.21) (2.57) (2.73)
Observations 317 228 317 228
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗ p < .01
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interpret this result as Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of the model. That is
the size of the estimated effect will largely explained by the context of pork-barreling in
the allocation of SAF in the road sector.
The improvement made by the instrumental variable reasonably takes place when we
compare the IV estimate with the OLS estimate on the coefficient of SAF allocation on
road sector. OLS yields positive sign but not statistically insignificant. The positive sign
indicates the selection bias in the allocation of SAF in the road sector. On the other
hand, in the absence of information on to what extent other spotty intervention in road
sector had been conducted by line ministries in at district level, the IV estimate yields
the contrasting sign, yet statistically insignificant. It indicates that the direct program
from the central government in road sector is biased toward less needed and non-SAF
recipients. This result suggests that under strong indication of political earmarking, the
impact of the special allocation fund in the road sector was not effective. This finding
confirms the view that corruption, or in this case study is referred as soft corruption; is
sand in the process of decentralising public service delivery in the road sector. We might
further infer that if the political earmarking act as the distraction of the formula based
allocation, we might expect that the net effect is worse as what is being expected on
the efficiency ground. The finding illuminates the efficiency issue as money goes to less
prioritised regions as the result of political earmarking.
6 Conclusion
We find an indication that the allocation of SAF in road sector is determined by the
political fragmentation in Indonesia in 2003. This indication can be interpreted as the
determination of the allocation was more of political earmarking rather than formula
based approach. Secondly, the result of this study also suggests that in the presence of
political earmarking, a more transparent mechanism o the transfers is needed as it po-
tentially hinders the effectiveness of public good provision. I find that the SAF allocation
in Indonesia is less effective in delivering an increase the percentage of rural with asphalt
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road in Indonesia in the early implementation of fiscal decentralisation.
Examining such causal impact is an important policy discussion because the mech-
anism into what extend net effect the political earmarking takes place in any public
spending will determine the further reform phase of the decentralisation. This study
confirms the sand hypothesis in the context of the decentralising public fund in the road
sector. The test under full formula based approach setting will be a valuable comple-
ment to this study to compare with the finding of this study. A failure to prioritise such
transparent instrument is likely to hinder the effectiveness of the specific transfer espe-
cially to promote catch-up process among districts. Within the majority proposition that
captive and pork-barrel politics is always bad because it allocates resources based upon
consideration of networks rather than efficiency or productivity, the Indonesian context
provides more emphasise of using a more simple approach such as block grant transfer in
allocating the intergovernmental transfer.
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